Digging Into The Debate Theory Archives is a series highlighting “old” debate theory articles that are particularly thought-provoking, influential, or illuminating and that active debate students would benefit from reading.
In February 2012, David Glass wrote an article in Rostrum proposing a new concept called “Neg-Neg Theory.” A play on the Plan-Plan Theory of the early 1990s, it challenged the assumption that the affirmative team must affirm the resolution: “rather than the affirmative being obligated to defend the resolution, the affirmative could take the initiative of proving the resolution to be incorrect or false.” Glass then attempted to lay out the corresponding affirmative and negative burdens that would be established if the affirmative opted to take a negative approach to the resolution.
I don’t recall much reaction to Glass’s article at the time. While an increasing number of affirmative teams kritiked or impact turned topicality during this era, I don’t remember any that cited Glass directly. Unavailable online, the article was then functionally memory-holed for the rest of the decade.
After a long hiatus, Glass’s article returned to The Discourse during the 2019-2020 season when a few affirmative teams began directly citing it to support a counter-interpretation against topicality and framework arguments. I believe but can’t confirm that Westwood was the first to do so.
In this post, I will explain and critique Glass’s Neg-Neg Theory. I will also share the full text of his article so that students can more easily read, study, and debate it.
Why was Glass’s article revisited in recent seasons? While his proposal was more about a return to counter-warrants-style “policy” arguments than kritiks, he argued that “debaters should not be forced to defend statements with which they disagree, or concepts that do not allow them ground that they deem to be strategic.” This was compatible with existing kritiks of topicality, and it gave the affirmative the added benefit of a theoretical model for determining competition in debates where the affirmative negates the resolution.
The part of Glass’s article that attempts to explain his theory of competition is somewhat confusing:
The affirmative could have the option of demonstrating that the resolution is flawed for some reason, by arguing that there are certain disadvantages that are intrinsic to topical action (disadvantages to action that falls within the scope of the resolution). The affirmative could demonstrate this by including some examples of topical action, and reasons why that action is bad (this approach was labeled “counter-warrants” in Hypothesis-Testing Theory; though in this case, the approach would be affirmative ground). The affirmative might also advance a proposal that is non-topical, but is limited in scope by solving the disadvantages intrinsic to the resolution. Thus, in Neg-Neg Theory, the resolution does not set the scope of the affirmative plan—rather, the need to solve disadvantages intrinsic to the resolution sets that boundary. The negative then could provide a counter-plan to the affirmative proposal, with the necessity of proving their counter-plan to be superior by solving the intrinsic disadvantages advanced by the affirmative without incurring certain problems caused by the affirmative’s approach. Alternatively, the negative could advocate the resolution, and advance a topical counter-plan to defeat the affirmative; but, again, they would not be required to do so.
As I understand Glass’s theory, the affirmative would have two choices in every debate: affirm the resolution (as per standard practice) or negate the resolution (by proving that there is an intrinsic disadvantage to topical action). If they opt for the latter approach, the affirmative may choose to negate topical action writ large or negate specific examples of topical action. They may also offer a non-topical plan to solve the intrinsic disadvantages to topical action.
In response to an affirmative that chooses to negate the resolution, the negative team also has two choices: affirm the resolution (by proposing a topical counterplan) or negate the affirmative’s negation (by proposing a non–topical counterplan that solves the intrinsic disadvantages to the resolution outlined by the affirmative without incurring another disadvantage to the affirmative’s proposal). Both choices raise unanswered theoretical questions.
First, how does a negative’s affirmation of the resolution compete with the affirmative’s negation of the resolution? This is straightforward only if the affirmative negates the resolution writ large. If they instead negate a specific example of the resolution, the negative’s affirmation of the resolution would need to address the affirmative’s specific example in order to prove competition.
Using this year’s water resources protection topic as an example, imagine that the affirmative negated the reinstatement of the Clean Water Rule by arguing that it would hurt business confidence and the economy. If the negative responds by affirming a different topical example of the resolution — regulating wastewater pollution from fracking operations, for example — why does their position compete with the affirmative’s? Presented with arguments opposing reinstatement of the Clean Water Rule and supporting regulation of fracking wastewater pollution, the judge should logically endorse both positions. In order to disprove the affirmative’s negation of the resolution by affirming the resolution, the negative would need to prove that reinstatement of the Clean Water Rule is good.
In this way, Neg-Neg Theory would functionally double the negative’s preparation burden: they must (still) be prepared to negate every topical example of the resolution (in debates where the affirmative chooses to affirm the resolution), but they must also be prepared to affirm every topical example of the resolution (in debates where the affirmative chooses instead to negate the resolution). Glass argues that “[increasing] the options available to the affirmative team [would] increas[e] education,” but he does not offer any compelling proof for this assertion.
Second, how can the negative reasonably prepare to “counter-negate” every potential affirmative negation of the resolution? Glass seems to understand that the issue of competition is a significant challenge for Neg-Neg Theory:
In Neg-Neg Theory, the key aspect is competition—that the affirmative and negative teams cannot be two ships passing in the night, but rather that the negative team has to do more than give an alternative rationale as to why the resolution is false… the negative has to prove the affirmative rationale to be incorrect and thus deserving of rejection for some reason.
He offers the following example to explain what this strategy might look like in practice:
As an example where Neg-Neg strategy might be employed, let’s examine the case of the 2011-2012 college debate resolution, that “The United States Federal Government should substantially increase its democracy assistance for one or more of the following: Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia, Yemen.” A Neg-Neg approach to this resolution would be for the affirmative to argue that increasing United States democracy assistance to Egypt would cause an anti-United States backlash, increasing support for terrorist activity in Egypt. The affirmative would therefore advocate stopping democracy assistance activities in Egypt. The negative could argue that taking the action to stop current activities would be perceived as an admission of guilt, causing even greater backlash, and propose instead to reach out to the Egyptian Military, and allow them to direct aid in any way that they want. This approach by the negative may or may not be topical—but as long as it competes with the affirmative approach, it would fulfill the requirement of a Neg-Neg framework.
This is less straightforward than it seems because of the acceptability of non-topical plans. Consider again the Clean Water Rule example: the affirmative argues that the topical action of restoring the Clean Water Rule would hurt business confidence and the economy, so they propose that the federal government codify a more limited definition of “waters of the United States” (perhaps akin to the Trump administration’s Navigable Waters Protection Rule). Of course, the negative could respond by defending the Clean Water Rule and criticizing the Navigable Waters Protection Rule. If they were prepared to do so, that would be the best strategy. But as noted above, the expectation that the negative should be prepared to defend both the affirmative and negative positions on every topical action is unreasonable and unrealistic.
How might the negative instead use the Neg-Neg strategy against this affirmative case? Remember, they would need to negate the resolution in a competitive way: their non-topical counterplan must solve the business confidence advantage in a different way from the plan, and it must have a net-benefit. This is very difficult. A counterplan to entirely eliminate federal jurisdiction over water pollution might be competitive if the negative could prove that the reinstatement of the Navigable Waters Protection Rule would also hurt business confidence. A counterplan to maintain the current (Bush administration, Rapanos-based) WOTUS definition might be competitive, perhaps because reinstating the NWPR would be politically costly for the Biden administration. The negative might be able to come up with other ideas, but the point is that these are extremely difficult strategies to research and prepare. They are plan-specific, but the range of potential affirmative plans is not limited by the resolution.
Ultimately, Neg-Neg Theory takes the resolution-focused concept of counter-warrants and imports it into a plan-focused framework for debate. The appeal of counter-warrants is that they remove the strategic value of small (“squirrel”) affirmative cases. Because the negative can always negate the whole resolution, they don’t need to have plan-specific evidence about every topical proposal. If the affirmative forwards a single example of the resolution, the negative can outweigh its benefits with disadvantages to multiple other examples of the resolution. There are downsides to this framework for debate, but it does ensure that neither side can be “caught off guard” — or to the extent that they can be, it doesn’t matter very much for the outcome of the debate. In every debate, both sides will be relatively well-prepared.
Bringing counter-warrants theory into a plan-focused framework foregoes these benefits and incurs significant costs. As noted above, it requires both teams to be prepared to affirm and negate every topical example of the resolution. In practice, this would undermine rather than improve the quality of debates. The incentive to dodge opposing arguments would be substantially strengthened, and it would make an already onerous preparation burden significantly tougher.
Could a more defensible version of Neg-Neg Theory be grounded in a resolution-focused framework? If the subject of the debate is the whole resolution, both teams must be prepared to affirm or negate it in order to compete in an alternating-sides tournament. If that is already the preparation expectation, couldn’t the affirmative be given the choice in each debate about whether they want to affirm or negate the resolution?
This could be more workable, but only if the negative was then required to assume the opposite burden: if the affirmative chooses to affirm the resolution, then the negative must negate it; if the affirmative chooses to negate the resolution, then the negative must affirm it. (Dave Stoecker-Strauss proposed a version of this to the college debate topic committee in 2017; it was rejected.) The problem with allowing both teams to negate the resolution in a resolution-focused debate is precisely the competition issue that Glass identifies: different reasons to negate the resolution do not compete with one another, so a Neg-Neg resolution-focused debate would be clashless (“two ships passing in the night”).
This is presumably why Glass decided to import the theory of counter-warrants into a plan-focused framework. In order to establish a basis for counterplan competition that is not based on the resolution, the affirmative needs to defend a plan. Once introduced, the plan becomes the basis for determining competition. But by eliminating the resolutional constraint on affirmative plan selection, Neg-Neg Theory’s assumptions about how the negative might prove competition are purely aspirational. In practice, the preparation burden is simply too great to expect high-quality, plan-specific counter-negative strategies.
This also explains why Glass’s article has been revisited by affirmative teams that kritik topicality rather than by affirmative teams that choose to read plans. While Glass’s theory is difficult to defend in plan-focused debates, it seems more defensible in debates about the whole resolution. An affirmative team defending a planless case might argue that plan-focused debates are bad, so the problems identified above about Glass’s theory are beside the point. This is a compelling argument, but it still doesn’t resolve the fundamental problems with determining competition in “negative vs. negative” debates.
Ultimately, this is why disputes over theories of competition are so common in “K v. K” debates: they require a theoretical model of competition not grounded in the resolution or the comparison between plans and counterplans. And the “easy” way around this — requiring the negative to affirm the resolution in response to affirmatives that negate the resolution — doesn’t resolve the kritik of requiring students to affirm a resolution they oppose. This has therefore remained a difficult theoretical controversy to resolve.
Can Glass help resolve it? I don’t think so. Because he was proposing his Neg-Neg Theory under a plan-focused framework, evidence from his article will not help proponents of planless or resolution-focused frameworks defend their kritiks of topicality. Students might be able to incorporate some of Glass’s arguments into their own theories, but they will need to go well beyond his 2012 version of Neg-Neg Theory to establish a persuasive framework position.
Finally, might Neg-Neg Theory be more viable on a very limited topic? Perhaps. But as a practical matter, that is unlikely to be the case (at least in high school policy debate) for the foreseeable future: topics are consistently too large for Neg-Neg Theory to make sense.
Even though I disagree with Glass’s conclusions, I appreciate the creativity of his theory. Thinking about the role of the resolution (both what it has historically been and what it could potentially be in the future) is something every contemporary student will benefit from doing. Glass’s article is a valuable provocation, and its full text is available below.
Glass, David. “Neg-Neg Policy Debate Theory: Escaping the Obligation to Defend a Resolution.” Rostrum, Volume 86, Issue 6, February, pp. 67-69.
In academic Policy Debate, the standard practice is for there to be two teams, one of which, the affirmative, is obligated to defend an imposed resolution, usually by presenting a plan of action that is consistent with that resolution—a plan that the affirmative seeks to demonstrate will result in advantageous effects, thereby proving the resolution correct. The other team, the negative, opposes the affirmative claims through a variety of strategems. In modern debate, the negative doesn’t necessarily have to argue outside the scope of the resolution—rather, the negative team just has to prove that the affirmative’s approach should be rejected for one reason or another, thereby demonstrating the affirmative’s conception of the resolution to be unacceptable.
However, in the course of events, there comes to pass every now and then a resolution that is so egregiously written, so poorly conceived, or so incompletely thought out, that few affirmative debaters can defend it in good conscience—or with much plausible chance of being successful in a competitive debate round. Even in settings where the resolution is not on face indefensible, one might ask whether the affirmative, merely by being so-labeled, must in fact be obligated to defend a resolution.
Indeed, one might ask why it absolutely must be the case that the affirmative argue in favor of a resolution that they might in actuality disagree with, and, if an alternate framework for debate is workable, why it might not be advocated by the academic Policy debater. This is to suggest that there is such an alternate possibility—to suggest that rather than the affirmative being obligated to defend the resolution, the affirmative could take the initiative of proving the resolution to be incorrect or false—and to do so in a way that does not require the negative team to defend the resolution (since to require such a thing would establish an untenable situation if the motivating factor for a Neg-Neg Framework is to allow for debate in the setting of a resolution’s indefensibility. However, the negative team could choose to affirm the resolution given a particular affirmative approach… it’s just important that they not be required to do so).
This theory of debate is called “Neg-Neg,” in recognition that it would allow for competing reasons as to why the resolution should be rejected—that the affirmative start with such a reason, and that the negative then argue for the rejection of the affirmative. [end page 67]
In Neg-Neg Theory, the key aspect is competition—that the affirmative and negative teams cannot be two ships passing in the night, but rather that the negative team has to do more than give an alternative rationale as to why the resolution is false… the negative has to prove the affirmative rationale to be incorrect and thus deserving of rejection for some reason.
It may be useful to take a step back and ask why Policy debates are so often (if not always) framed by a particular resolution. The main reason is practical: both teams, and their coaches and judges, need to be informed in advance as to the topic of the debate, so that the debaters can properly prepare to argue, and the judges can take some time to become informed about the topic, so that a competent decision can be rendered. The resolution thus has a limiting function, which is why affirmatives who propose plans that fall outside the scope of the resolution are usually rejected as being “non topical.” This is done for reasons of fundamental fairness—the negative cannot be expected to prepare for an infinite number of proposals advanced by the affirmative (who have the right to set the particular topic of discussion, within the set delimited by the resolution). Also, on a fundamental level, a resolution is proposed for debate in order to present an issue that is deemed worthy of debate.
In Neg-Neg Theory, the resolution would still have the necessary function of limiting affirmative ground. In this case, the affirmative could have the option of demonstrating that the resolution is flawed for some reason, by arguing that there are certain disadvantages that are intrinsic to topical action (disadvantages to action that falls within the scope of the resolution). The affirmative could demonstrate this by including some examples of topical action, and reasons why that action is bad (this approach was labeled “counter-warrants” in Hypothesis-Testing Theory; though in this case, the approach would be affirmative ground). The affirmative might also advance a proposal that is non-topical, but is limited in scope by solving the disadvantages intrinsic to the resolution. Thus, in Neg-Neg Theory, the resolution does not set the scope of the affirmative plan—rather, the need to solve disadvantages intrinsic to the resolution sets that boundary. The negative then could provide a counter-plan to the affirmative proposal, with the necessity of proving their counter-plan to be superior by solving the intrinsic disadvantages advanced by the affirmative without incurring certain problems caused by the affirmative’s approach. Alternatively, the negative could advocate the resolution, and advance a topical counter-plan to defeat the affirmative; but, again, they would not be required to do so.
As an example where Neg-Neg strategy might be employed, let’s examine the case of the 2011-2012 college debate resolution, that “The United States Federal Government should substantially increase its democracy assistance for one or more of the following: Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia, Yemen.” A Neg-Neg approach to this resolution would be for the affirmative to argue that increasing United States democracy assistance to Egypt would cause an anti-United States backlash, increasing support for terrorist activity in Egypt. The affirmative would therefore advocate stopping democracy assistance activities in Egypt. The negative could argue that taking the action to stop current activities would be perceived as an admission of guilt, causing even greater backlash, and propose instead to reach out to the Egyptian Military, and allow them to direct aid in any way that they want. This approach by the negative may or may not be topical—but as long as it competes with the affirmative approach, it would fulfill the requirement of a Neg-Neg framework.
A Neg-Neg approach to Policy Debate would be useful in many instances. First, it would free the affirmative team from defending a resolution with which they fundamentally disagree. Second, it would spare the affirmative team from having to find an approach consistent with a resolution in those instances where the resolution does not provide topical ground that is strategic. Third, it would increase the options available to the affirmative team, increasing education.
Indeed, academic Policy Debate exists to teach students to think strategically and to learn how to defend a particular position from attack. Neg-Neg approaches to academic Policy Debate preserve this fundamental purpose of the activity, still allowing focus on either policy concerns brought up by a particular resolution, or philosophical or critical issues that [end page 68] are suggested by that resolution. Neg-Neg Theory allows for focus on a particular resolution, and on how the problems the resolution is designed to address might best be solved.
The affirmative team might only be required to “affirm” their position, even if that position is a rejection of the resolution, and the negative to refute the affirmative. The resolution would exist to provide ground for debate, as a tentative idea that might be supported—but one that does not have to be supported.
There exist in life certain situations that are viewed as “no win scenarios”—instances where there is no answer where a good result will be obtained. Students should be trained to avoid such scenarios. Debaters should not be forced to defend statements with which they disagree, or concepts that do not allow them ground that they deem to be strategic. Neg-Neg Theory provides debaters with a way out of potential no-win scenarios, and allows them to increase the scope of possibilities from whence a positive outcome might be discovered.
Therefore, it is advocated that a Neg-Neg Framework of debate be adopted as acceptable within the scope of Policy Debate.
David Glass is an assistant debate coach at Harvard. He’s published prior debate theory articles in Rostrum, and two philosophy papers on scientific experimental design in peer reviewed journals. He has an M.D. and is the author of more than 70 other papers on molecular and cellular biology. He coached high school debate for over 30 years, and is a current board member of the Boston Debate League, and a former president of the National Debate Coaches Association.