Topic Updates

After the last podcast a few people asked me about what kind of things they should be reading to try and keep up to date with the topics development. So from time to time I will post some links that I think are relevant/would be useful to read under the banner of topic updates.





3 thoughts on “Topic Updates

  1. tim alderete

    I've done a bit of Korea Updating lately, so here are some things I went and did:

    1. Search your authors – we already had Bandow, Carpenter and Feffer evidence in our 1AC. Doing searches for those authors after the Artillery Barrage has turned up a lot of articles, expecially by Bandow.

    2. Paul Stares wrote a paper for the Council on Foreign Relations that was released on Nov 22 that would have been the best article on the case if it hadn't been made "out of date" the next day. Forward searching Stares (searching for people who cited or who wrote about Stares) produced a lot of articles.

    3. Following the blogs and commentary / news sections for the standard FP/IR think tanks, like AEI, Heritage, CSIS, Cato, Eurasian Review, etc has produced a lot of articles by qualified authors.

    4. Making sure that you use the date function, or putting "yeonpyeong" into your normal searches helps an enormous amount.

    Stares November 2010 – Council on Foreign Relations [Paul B. Military Escalation in Korea CONTINGENCY PLANNING MEMORANDUM NO. 10

    Fook Weng Loo Dec 1, 2010 – Professor of War and Strategy at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies [Bernard… Nanyang Technological Univ S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Strategic Stability

    Bandow, Nov 29 2010 – Senior Fellow at Cato [ Sixty Years Is Enough The American Spectator]

  2. Scottyp4313nr

    I didn't get around to reading Alderete's article right away, but now having done so- could this be the death knell to the 1AC Kagan/2AC Mearsheimer K strategy deployed by so many teams on this topic? Relevant part of the article:

    The root cause of America’s troubles is that it adopted a flawed grand strategy after the Cold War. From the Clinton administration on, the United States rejected all these other avenues, instead pursuing global dominance, or what might alternatively be called global hegemony, which was not just doomed to fail, but likely to backfire in dangerous ways if it relied too heavily on military force to achieve its ambitious agenda.

    Global dominance has two broad objectives: maintaining American primacy, which means making sure that the United States remains the most powerful state in the international system; and spreading democracy across the globe, in effect, making the world over in America’s image. The underlying belief is that new liberal democracies will be peacefully inclined and pro-American, so the more the better. Of course, this means that Washington must care a lot about every country’s politics. With global dominance, no serious attempt is made to prioritize U.S. interests, because they are virtually limitless.

    This grand strategy is “imperial” at its core; its proponents believe that the United States has the right as well as the responsibility to interfere in the politics of other countries. One would think that such arrogance might alienate other states, but most American policy makers of the early nineties and beyond were confident that would not happen, instead believing that other countries—save for so-called rogue states like Iran and North Korea—would see the United States as a benign hegemon serving their own interests.

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