Cut Cards for Google Wave-Updated

So I have some google wave invites and was thinking about how to dole them out in a just manner and I thought perhaps a little bit of a contest. The rules and description are below.

UPDATE- if you have to email me to ask what google wave is you should first familiarize your self with google…

Ok so this is basically an evidence quality contest. The idea being it is some what like the ol ev challenge at evtub but since I have done my best to repress all memories of evtub we won’t call it that. So i’m gonna give you three categories of a “card”. To win you must cut the best card you can find that supports the argument for it, and it has to be a card  we haven’t heard before. So if a category was “realism inevitable” and you submitted murray you wouldn’t get credit even though Roy would think it was the best card of all time.

You should both paste the card in the comments so that people will know when someone has beaten them to a card, and email the card in a word document (since the comments don’t allow formatting) to scott@the3nr.com. Some things that will make your card stand out would be

-recenecy

-author qualifications

-warrants

-not being from google news

I tried to come up with some broad categories that would be useful to everyone (based on debates I have seen and discussions that have come up recently)

Judging- I may consult Roy/Batterman if there are some close calls but generally it will be in-genuine so as not to collapse my leadership.

1. Word Pics- this can either be a card that they (or the style of argument they represent) are good or bad, either way. But the card should make some kind of argument either for or against them. Obviously as previously mentioned it can’t be something we’ve heard of so a Butler or frameworks institute card won’t count.I’ll also lump in here reps K good/bad since the judge choice discussion has gotten some heat and the 2 styles of cards are related.

2. Predictions Good/Bad- as per Batterman on the podcast, try to find some better cards then monkeys throwing darts. Cards that obviously we have heard of include Kurasawa, Fitzsimmons, Bleiker etc. This category will probably be harder than the above since the threshold for what is a good card will already be higher.

3.  Epistemology- this can be either an aff card that you would read when the neg reads a k of epistemology (in the sort of vein of the 2AC K post from a bit ago) or a neg card about the importance of epistemology- but again, has to be an unknown.

3 thoughts on “Cut Cards for Google Wave-Updated

  1. David Mullins

    Empiricism is key- saying predictions are psychologically difficult does not refute the specificities of the affirmative.

    Eliezer Yudkowsky, Research Fellow at the Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence that has published multiple peer-reviewed papers on risk assessment. Cognitive biases potentially affecting judgment of global risks Forthcoming in Global Catastrophic Risks, eds. Nick Bostrom and Milan Cirkovic. August 31, 2006.

    Every true idea which discomforts you will seem to match the pattern of at least one psychological error. Robert Pirsig said: "The world's biggest fool can say the sun is shining, but that doesn't make it dark out." If you believe someone is guilty of a psychological error, then demonstrate your competence by first demolishing their consequential factual errors. If there are no factual errors, then what matters the psychology? The temptation of psychology is that, knowing a little psychology, we can meddle in arguments where we have no technical expertise – instead sagely analyzing the psychology of the disputants. If someone wrote a novel about an asteroid strike destroying modern civilization, then someone might criticize that novel as extreme, dystopian, apocalyptic; symptomatic of the author's naive inability to deal with a complex technological society. We should recognize this as a literary criticism, not a scientific one; it is about good or bad novels, not good or bad hypotheses. To quantify the annual probability of an asteroid strike in real life, one must study astronomy and the historical record: no amount of literary criticism can put a number on it. Garreau (2005) seems to hold that a scenario of a mind slowly increasing in capability, is more mature and sophisticated than a scenario of extremely rapid intelligence increase. But that's a technical question, not a matter of taste; no amount of psychologizing can tell you the exact slope of that curve. It's harder to abuse heuristics and biases than psychoanalysis. Accusing someone of conjunction fallacy leads naturally into listing the specific details that you think are burdensome and drive down the joint probability. Even so, do not lose track of the real- world facts of primary interest; do not let the argument become about psychology. Despite all dangers and temptations, it is better to know about psychological biases than to not know. Otherwise we will walk directly into the whirling helicopter blades of life. But be very careful not to have too much fun accusing others of biases. That is the road that leads to becoming a sophisticated arguer – someone who, faced with any discomforting argument, finds at once a bias in it. The one whom you must watch above all is yourself. Jerry Cleaver said: "What does you in is not failure to apply some high-level, intricate, complicated technique. It's overlooking the basics. Not keeping your eye on the ball." Analyses should finally center on testable real-world assertions. Do not take your eye off the ball.

  2. Holden Choi

    Scenario Construction is flawed – 2 reasons:
    1. The causal story the 1AC spins falsely increases confidence in it because this simulation heuristic makes it seem more probable when it’s actually not
    2. The media bias towards large impact like terrorism or wars makes scenario planners more likely to leap to these conclusions.
    George Wright and Paul Goodwin June 5th – 2009 (Durham Business School, University of Durham, School of Management, University of Bath, “Decision making and planning under low levels of predictability: Enhancing the scenario method”, International Journal of Forcasting, Volume 25 Issue 4 October-December, pgs. 813-825, Science Direct)
    Note that, in general, the two clusters that result from the application of the intuitive logic approach to scenario construction will each contain a mix of pre-determined elements and what are perceived as critical uncertainties that are causally linked together. Generally, four scenarios are constructed that are derived from the resolution of events within each cluster into two major outcomes — with each of the outcomes of the first cluster then being combined with each of the outcomes of the second cluster (see van der Heijden et al., 2002, chapter 7, for more details). Thus, the resolution of the contents of the two high-impact, high-uncertainty clusters drives the development of the storylines of the four resultant scenarios. The development of the four storylines will, in practice, also utilise other uncertainties and pre-determined elements that have been generated by scenario workshop participants but which are seen by these participants to have less impact on the focal issue of concern. It follows that each of the four resultant scenarios will be separable from the other three, and also more extreme than the other three in some ways. Since each scenario represents an intersection of resolved uncertainties, each detailed scenario will, logically, have an infinitesimal likelihood of actual occurrence. It also follows that the interactions of resolved uncertainties that are identified by participants but which are not part of the two high-impact clusters may have led to the development of quite different scenarios, if they were instead taken as the focal uncertainties that drive the construction of the scenarios — c.f. Taleb’s three-body problem that we described earlier. In short, the step-by-step components of the intuitive logic method of scenario construction may restrict the diversity of the constructed scenarios. We return to this issue in the final section of our paper, when we propose new approaches to coping with low predictability. Scenario planning is thus designed to be an organizationally based social-reasoning process which utilises dialogue and conversation to share participants’ perceptions of the environment and to facilitate participants’ interactions as they engage in a process of sense-making through theory building and storytelling. The process of building scenarios should serve to bring latent issues to the surface, so that it is more difficult to deny the prospect of high-impact events when there is objective information available that they are liable to occur. This is particularly likely to be the case where outside participants or independent facilitators are involved in the process. Thus, scenario planning may help to reduce some of the motivational biases that were outlined earlier. Gregory and Duran (2001) and Healey and Hodgkinson (2008) reviewed some problematic issues with scenario planning. Included in these is the issue that having individuals, or groups of individuals, imagining the occurrence of a sequence of events makes the focal sequence appear more likely to occur than the normative probability computed for the intersection of these individually-evaluated events would imply. Tversky and Kahneman labelled this as a bias due to the operation of the “simulation heuristic”. Specifically, if the events’ occurrences are linked in a causal chain (where one event causes the occurrence of the next), the intersection will be viewed as having an increased likelihood. As such, the act of constructing scenarios may, by itself, produce increased, but inappropriate, confidence in one’s ability to anticipate the future (Kuhn & Sniezek, 1996). Thus, while the focus on causal chains in scenario planning is a strength, because a knowledge of the causal interactions of events, in principle, allows the decision maker to go beyond the use of extrapolation based on historical data in the reference class, it can also be a weakness. The use of multiple scenarios that provide plausible, but different, chains of causality thus provides one potential way to alleviate such overconfidence in the unfolding of a single, focal, scenario. However, Healey and Hodgkinson noted that the increased plausibility of focal scenarios may exacerbate another problematic issue: if the components of a scenario are derived from the current mental models of the decision makers, then these mental models will be strengthened by the operation of the simulation heuristic. As O’Brien (2004) argued, in practice, scenario participants tend to regularly emphasise economic factors — such as exchange rates, interest rates, and the focal country’s economic activity — as uncertainties that are subsequently given prominence in the scenarios that participants constructed. Also, recent and current media-emphasised concerns (e.g. of terrorism activities) tend also to replicate themselves in constructed scenarios through the operation of the availability bias. O’Brien labelled these practice-recognised issues as “future myopia”. By contrast, as Wright, Cairns, and Goodwin (2009) note, one way which is used in practice by scenario practitioners, is to challenge the decision makers’ mental models by the introduction of what the scenario community term “remarkable people” into the strategic conversation — i.e., including as participants in a scenario exercise individuals (often from outside the host organization) who hold disparate and contradictory views on key uncertainties. Scenario planning practitioners argue that between-workshop activity spent on researching the nature of critical uncertainties identified in earlier workshops will also add to the quality of a strategic conversation about the nature of the future, but there is no empirical evidence on the benefit of such desk-based research. In summary, while the application of the scenario method may reduce any tendency to deny the prospect of undesirable events because of its explicit nature, it may reinforce existing framings of the future unless the addition of the views of “remarkable people” can counter these viewpoints. The creation of detailed scenarios–containing particular causal chains of events–may also serve to increase the perceived likelihood that a specific scenario will, in fact, occur. Also, the method may cause participants to discount the possibility of high impact events which are not reached via these causal chains. Crisis management has been proposed as one method to deal with unexpected events, and we next summarise this method and evaluate whether there are any insights within this approach that can usefully be applied to the development of the scenario method, in order to ameliorate the weaknesses that we have identified and discussed.

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